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INTRODUCTION 
On August 19, 2019, the Business Roundtable (“BRT”) issued a revised 
statement on corporate purpose signed by 181 influential chief  executive 
officers.1 Entitled “Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of  a 
Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That Serves All Americans,’” the 
statement notes that the BRT is moving away from shareholder primacy2 
 
* Associate Professor of  Business Law and Management, Belmont University, Jack 
C. Massey College of  Business. The author thanks all of  the participants in the University 
of  Tennessee School of  Law’s Business Transactions: Connecting the Threads III 
symposium. In particular, the author thanks professor commenter Eric Amarante and 
student commenter Phil Reed. 
1 Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of  a Corporation to Promote ‘An Economy That 
Serves All Americans’, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Business 
Roundtable Redefines], https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines
-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans. 
2 The term “shareholder primacy” can be used to address the purpose and/or the 
governance of  corporations. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means 
and Ends of  Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 549–50 (2003) (“[A]ll of  these 
models are ways of  thinking about the means and ends of  corporate governance. They 
strive to answer two basic sets of  questions: (1) as to the means of  corporate governance, 
who holds ultimate decisionmaking power? and (2) as to the ends of  corporate 
governance, whose interests should prevail? When the ultimate decisionmaker is 
presented with a zero-sum game, in which it must prefer the interests of  one constituency 
class over those of  all others, which constituency wins?”); Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating 
Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1537, 1599 (2018) (“[S]hareholder primacy holds that the 
shareholders are of  utmost importance in thinking about the aims and governance of  a 
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and toward a multi-stakeholder approach.3 The body of  the statement 
claims that “[e]ach of  our stakeholders is essential. We commit to deliver 
value to all of  them, for the future success of  our companies, our 
communities and our country.”4 The statement specifically highlights 
customers, employees, suppliers, communities (including the 
environment), and long-term value for shareholders as important to 
firms.5 In focusing on a wide range of  stakeholders, the BRT’s 2019 
Statement departs from the group’s 1997 declaration that “the principal 
objective of  a business enterprise is to generate economic returns to its 
owners.”6 
Reaction to the BRT’s 2019 revised statement on corporate purpose 
has been swift and varied. These reactions could be loosely grouped into 
one or more of  three broad categories--optimistic praise,7 supportive 
 
corporation.”). The BRT statement appears to use the term “shareholder primacy” in the 
first way, addressing the aim of  the corporation. While I believe that it is cleaner to use 
“shareholder primacy” to address who should govern corporations, so that it lines up 
squarely against Stephen Bainbridge’s “director primacy,” which posits that directors 
should be in control of  the governance of  corporations, I will use the term like the BRT 
does, to address the ends of  a corporation.  
3 Business Roundtable Redefines, supra note 2.  
4 Id.  
5 Id.  
6 Statement on Corporate Governance, BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (Sept. 1997), http:// 
www.ralphgomory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Business-Roundtable-1997.pdf. 
7 See, e.g., Alan Murray, America’s CEOs Seek a New Purpose for the Corporation,  
FORTUNE (Aug. 19, 2019, 4:30 AM), https://fortune.com/longform/business-round
table-ceos-corporations-purpose/ (“[G]iven the immense power large companies exercise 
in society, the new social consciousness of  business surely should be seen as a step in the 
right direction. At a time when the nation’s political leadership is tied in knots, more 
interested in fighting partisan battles than in uniting to solve public problems, business 
leadership is filling the leadership vacuum.”); Steven Pearlstein, Top CEOs are Reclaiming 
Legitimacy by Advancing a Vision of  What’s Good for America, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2019, 
5:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/08/19/top-ceos-are-re clai
ming-legitimacy-by-advancing-vision-whats-good-america/ (“[T]oday’s statement by the 
Business Roundtable disavowing shareholder primacy is so significant and so welcome. 
In the Roundtable’s new formulation of  corporate purpose, delivering value to 
customers, investing in employees, dealing fairly and honestly with suppliers, supporting 
communities and protecting the environment all have equal billing with generating long-
term value for shareholders. The statement rejects the whole idea of  ‘maximizing’ one 
value to the exclusion of  all the others. Instead, it acknowledges the need for balance and 
compromise in serving all of  a company’s stakeholders.”). Professor Eric Amarante, in 
his symposium response, suggested a fourth category of  “who cares?” I would place 
most of  the commenters who think that the statement will not amount to much, into the 
second category of  “supportive pessimism.” Those who do not think the statement will 
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pessimism,8 and blunt opposition.9 This essay primarily addresses the 
second reaction – those who express support for valuing all stakeholders, 
 
move the needle, but think the statement is wrongheaded, I would place in the third 
category of  “blunt opposition.” Eric Amarante, Commentary on Professor Murray’s Presentation, 
21 TENN. J. BUS. L. 273, 273 (2020). 
8 See, e.g., David Gelles & David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer 
Everything, Top C.E.O.s Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
08/19/business/business-roundtable-ceos-corporations.html (“There was no mention at 
the Roundtable of  curbing executive compensation, a lightning-rod topic when the 
highest-paid 100 chief  executives make 254 times the salary of  an employee receiving the 
median pay at their company . . . . The Business Roundtable did not provide specifics on 
how it would carry out its newly stated ideals, offering more of  a mission statement than 
a plan of  action. . . . ‘If  the Business Roundtable is serious, it should tomorrow throw its 
weight behind legislative proposals that would put the teeth of  the law into these 
boardroom platitudes,’ said Anand Giridharadas.”); Jay Coen Gilbert, Andrew Kassoy, & 
Bart Houlahan, Don’t Believe the Business Roundtable has Changed Until Its CEOs’ Actions Match 
Their Words, FAST CO. (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90393303/dont-
believe-the-business-roundtable-has-changed-until-its-ceos-actions-match-their-words (“It’s 
time we work together to redesign an economic system for the 21st century that prioritizes 
the long term over the short term and the creation of  value for all stakeholders, not just 
shareholders. Unless we address the systemic context in which CEOs operate, celebrating 
their latest announcements about purpose will remain more hope than strategy.”); Katrina 
vanden Heuvel, Big Business Is Suddenly Showing a Conscience. But Is That Enough?, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 27, 2019, 7:51 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/
08/27/big-business-is-suddenly-showing-conscience-is-that-enough/ (“Worse yet, the 
Business Roundtable’s statement offers no hint as to how corporations plan to fulfill to 
their newly enlightened purpose . . . . If  big corporations want people to believe that 
profits are not their only concern, they need to start walking the walk.”); Andrew 
Winston, Is the Business Roundtable Statement Just Empty Rhetoric?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 30, 
2019), https://hbr.org/2019/08/is-the-business-roundtable-statement-just-empty-
rhetoric (“The BRT statement is a nice start. This new discussion of  purpose is good, 
and it mirrors what some big investors are saying. But we need a much bigger pivot to 
circular, renewable-energy-based business models that value the long-term, protect 
natural capital, and invest in human development and equality. That level of  change is 
currently light years beyond the BRT statement.”). 
9 See, e.g., David L. Bahnsen, Business Roundtable Pretends to Redefine What a Corporation 
Does, NAT’L REV. (Aug. 26, 2019, 11:27 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/
08/business-roundtable-pretends-to-redefine-what-a-corporation-does/ (“If  today’s 
corporate-responsibility police truly want a free and virtuous society, they are better off  
focusing their efforts on eliminating the crony-capitalist abuses that seek to squash 
competition.”); Stephen Bainbridge, A Tweet to the Business Roundtable e the Law of  Corporate 
Purpose, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Aug. 19, 2019, 1:59 PM), https:// professor
bainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2019/08/a-tweet-to-the-business-roundtable
-re-the-law-of-corporate-purpose.html (“Memo to the @BizRoundtable: You don’t get 
to ‘redefine’ anything. Only the Delaware courts can change the law of  corporate 
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but doubt that the companies represented by the BRT will engage in 
meaningful change. The pessimism seems to spring from the toothlessness 
of  the BRT’s statement10 and the possible hidden motives, such as quieting 
activist shareholders11 or heading off  more aggressive stakeholder 
governance proposals like Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism 
Act.12 To address the pervasiveness of  the pessimism, this essay suggests 
 
purpose. And, as you ought to know, Delaware comes down square on the side of  
shareholder wealth maximization.”); The Editorial Board, The ‘Stakeholder’ CEOs, WALL 
ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2019, 5:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-stakeholder-ceos-
11566248641 (“One virtue of  the shareholder model is that it focuses the corporate 
mission on measurable financial results. An ill-defined stakeholder model can quickly 
become a license for CEOs to waste capital on projects that might make them local or 
political heroes but ill-serve those same stakeholders if  the business falters.”); Steve H. 
Hanke, Business Roundtable suffers from economic illiteracy, USA TODAY (Aug. 28, 2019, 5:24 
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/08/28/business-roundtable-suffers
-economic-illiteracy-editorials-debates/2144794001/ (“The Roundtable’s new anti-
capitalist mission statement promises to dilute and muffle shareholders’ voices and 
further politicize corporate governance.”); Nell Minow, Six Reasons We Don’t Trust the New 
“Stakeholder” Promise from the Business Roundtable, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE 
(Sept. 2, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/09/02/six-reasons-we-dont-trust-
the-new-stakeholder-promise-from-the-business-roundtable/ (“I am skeptical about what 
the CEO signatories to this statement have in mind for six reasons . . . . 1. We’ve seen 
this before . . . . 2. It does not really mean anything . . . . 3. It is not consistent with the 
principles of  capitalism . . . . 4. We are waiting to see CEOs put their money where their 
mouths are . . . . 5. There is a bait and switch element . . . . 6. Corporations are not 
designed for making public policy.”). 
10 See, e.g., Helaine Olen, CEOs Don’t Want to be Blamed for Inequality — or do Anything 
About It, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2019, 6:54 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/2019/08/22/ceos-dont-want-be-blamed-inequality-or-do-anything-about-it/ (“So should 
we celebrate? Well, not so fast. You might notice that this statement does not include any 
requests for changes in the law, ironclad promises that they will reduce even further 
growth of  their out-of-control pay (according to the AFL-CIO, the average S&P 500 
CEO earned 287 times what the average worker made last year) or, well, anything that 
would make it legally enforceable.”). 
11 Ann Lipton, Everything Is About Stakeholders, BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (Aug. 24, 2019), 
https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2019/08/everything-is-about-
stakeholders.html (“[A]rguments about managers accommodating corporate stakeholders 
are frequently code for ‘activist shareholders leave us alone,’ which has little to do with 
corporate well-being and everything to do with management entrenchment.”). 
12See Press Release, Warren Introduces Accountable Capitalism Act (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-introduces-accountable
-capitalism-act; Julie Wittes Schlack, The Business Roundtable Has a Change of  Heart? I Think 
Not, COGNOSCENTI (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2019/08/28/
the-business-roundtable-corporate-social-responsibility-julie-wittes-schlack (“Public 
corporations are just that — public — and must be subject to the same sorts of  
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five possible governance proposals for corporations who take the BRT’s 
statement seriously and want to take concrete steps beyond pretty 
platitudes. The five corporate governance proposals, set forth in more 
detail below, are (1) amend the firm’s corporate purpose in its governing 
documents, (2) convert to a benefit corporation, (3) engage in meaningful 
social reporting, (4) support legislation that benefits corporate 
stakeholders, and (5) give stakeholder representatives corporate 
governance rights, such as the right to vote for directors and bring 
derivative lawsuits.13  
I. AMEND GOVERNING DOCUMENTS 
Socially serious BRT companies could memorialize a multi-
stakeholder corporate purpose statement in their governing documents, 
namely their articles of  incorporation and bylaws. If  the firms are nervous 
about whether this departure from shareholder primacy would be allowed 
in Delaware, the companies could reincorporate in a more stakeholder 
friendly state. For example, Texas and Oregon have made unmistakably 
clear that social purposes are allowed for traditional for-profit 
 
monitoring and controls as other public assets. Elizabeth Warren’s legislation, the 
Accountable Capitalism Act, would require that corporations with more than $1 billion 
in revenue be federally chartered as benefit corporations (or b-corps) — companies that 
recognize that their duties extend beyond maximizing profits for shareholders. Call me 
cynical, but I suspect that this is precisely what the Business Roundtable is trying to 
prevent with its laudable but vague pronouncement.”); see also The Editorial Board, supra 
note 10 (“There is also more than a whiff  of  pre-emptive politics here. The executives—
the Business Roundtable is led by JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon—know they are political 
targets. They see socialism on the rise, with Senator Elizabeth Warren proposing to 
redefine corporate governance in law with explicit direction to serve ‘stakeholders.’ Her 
goal is to redirect corporate capital to serve political goals favored by unions, 
environmentalists and trial lawyers. The CEOs no doubt want to get out in front of  this 
by showing what splendid corporate citizens they are.”); Martin Lipton & Wachtell 
Lipton, Stakeholder Corporate Governance Business Roundtable and Council of  Institutional 
Investors, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Aug. 21, 2019), https://corpgov. 
law.harvard.edu/2019/08/21/stakeholder-corporate-governance-business-roundtable-and
-council-of-institutional-investors/ (“The BRT principles are critical to preserving our 
corporate system which relies on the integrity of  managements and boards of  directors 
and on free and open markets. Shareholder primacy was ill-conceived in the first place 
and has utterly failed to provide for the needs of  all stakeholders. The alternative is state 
corporatism in the form of  legislation like Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act. 
Not many members of  the [Council of  Institutional Investors] would prefer that.”). 
13 Corporations could adopt one or more of  these suggestions, and, as noted below, 
it is understood that many of  these proposals would require shareholder approval.  
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corporations.14 In addition, a majority of  states (though not Delaware) 
have adopted “other constituency” statutes, which give directors more 
latitude to consider nonshareholder stakeholders in decision-making.15 Of  
course, these changes would require support of  shareholders, but the 
directors could at least put forward the proposals and publicly support 
these changes, if  the directors were seriously interested in carrying out the 
BRT’s 2019 Statement.  
II. CONVERT TO BENEFIT CORPORATION  
If  the directors wish to stay incorporated in Delaware, they could 
convert their companies to public benefit corporations (“PBC”).16 
Delaware law requires that PBCs “be managed in a manner that balances 
the stockholders’ pecuniary interests, the best interests of  those materially 
affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the public benefit or public 
 
14 TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 3.007(d) (West 2017) (“[A] for-profit corporation 
may include one or more social purposes in addition to the purpose or purposes required 
to be stated in the corporation’s certificate of  formation by Section 3.005(a)(3). The 
corporation may also include in the certificate of  formation a provision that the board 
of  directors and officers of  the corporation shall consider any social purpose specified 
in the certificate of  formation in discharging the duties of  directors or officers under this 
code or otherwise.”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 60.047(2)(e) (West 2017) (“The articles of  
incorporation may set forth . . . [a] provision authorizing or directing the corporation to 
conduct the business of  the corporation in a manner that is environmentally and socially 
responsible”). See generally, Judd F. Sneirson, Race to the Left: A Legislator’s Guide to Greening 
a Corporate Code, 88 OR. L. REV. 491 (2009). 
15 See Mohsen Manesh, Introducing the Totally Unnecessary Benefit LLC, 97 N.C. L. REV. 
603, 633–34 (2019) (“Although most large corporations choose to organize under 
Delaware law, all businesses have the option to incorporate elsewhere. Outside of  
Delaware, thirty-two states have adopted so-called constituency statutes. These statutes 
explicitly authorize the directors of  a corporation to consider a broad range of  factors 
affecting nonshareholding constituencies when discharging their statutory duty to 
manage the corporation. Some states’ constituency statutes limit a board’s authority to 
consider nonshareholder concerns to situations involving the sale or takeover of  the 
corporation. Other states’ constituency statutes are broader, allowing a board to consider 
the impact on nonshareholding constituencies in all matters brought before the board. 
In either case, states that have adopted constituency statutes have affirmatively rejected 
the notion that a corporate board of  directors must consider and pursue shareholder 
interests only.” (citations omitted)). 
16 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 361–368 (West 2020). See generally J. Haskell Murray, 
Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 
345 (2014); Alicia Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who’s Opting 
In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247 (2014). 
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benefits identified in its certificate of  incorporation.”17 This statutory 
requirement to balance the interests of  all stakeholders lines up well with 
the BRT’s 2019 Statement.18 Benefit corporation statutes, including 
Delaware’s PBC statute, are far from perfect, and do not provide much in 
the way of  accountability, but the conversion would increase, even if  just 
slightly, the chance of  litigation if  directors ignored stakeholders.19 
Directors would have to rally support of  at least two-thirds of  
stockholders to convert to a PBC, but again, directors could show their 
seriousness about the BRT’s 2019 Statement by putting the proposal 
forward.20  
Over thirty states now have some form of  a benefit corporation 
statute, so companies have quite a few options outside of  Delaware if  they 
prefer another state or another version of  the legislation.21 Outside of  
Delaware, the vast majority of  states have followed the Model Benefit 
 
17 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 362(a) (West 2020); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 
365(a) (West 2020) (“[D]irectors shall manage or direct the business and affairs of  the 
public benefit corporation in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests of  the 
stockholders, the best interests of  those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, 
and the specific public benefit or public benefits identified in its certificate of  
incorporation.”). 
18 Business Roundtable Redefines, supra note 2. 
19 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (West 2020) (stating that the PBC limits derivative 
lawsuits challenging the management of  the PBC to stockholders who own at least 2% 
of  the outstanding shares or at least $2 million in shares of  the company. As such, duties 
to balance the interests of  nonshareholder stakeholders may be underenforced unless 
there are large, socially serious shareholders); Elizabeth Schmidt, New Legal Structures for 
Social Enterprises: Designed for One Role but Playing Another, 43 VT. L. REV. 675, 713–14 (2019) 
(“The issues with the benefit statute are somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, there 
is not enough guidance to protect directors, and on the other, there is so much protection 
of  the directors that the mission is not protected . . . . At one level, the purpose statement 
does provide directors with some certainty because the articles of  incorporation, which 
provide the authority to do business in the state, requires the enterprise to have a ‘material 
positive impact on society.’ That provides the state’s imprimatur on the stakeholder value 
doctrine, which is a major shift. But it is largely a symbolic shift because the statute does 
not provide any other guidance to the board members. We do not know what a ‘material 
positive impact’ is or how to measure it.” (citations omitted)).  
20 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 363 (West 2020). (stating that stockholders who do 
not vote in favor of  the conversion may be entitled to appraisal rights; however, if  the 
conversion is favorably received, those stockholders could be paid and easily replaced by 
additional stockholders). 
21 SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW TRACKER, https://socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2019).  
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Corporation Legislation (the “Model”).22 The Model, and states that 
follow the Model, lists the stakeholders that must be considered in director 
decision making.23 The Model’s stakeholder list includes all the stakeholder 
groups mentioned in the BRT’s 2019 Statement.24 The Model also includes 
annual benefit reporting requirements, public posting of  the reports, and 
use of  an independent third-party standard in the reporting process, while 
Delaware only requires biennial reporting without mandating public 
posting of  the reports or use of  a third-party standard.25 
III. ENGAGE IN MEANINGFUL SOCIAL REPORTING  
Converting to a benefit corporation would impose some social 
reporting requirements, but those statutory reporting requirements are 
incredibly weak.26 Academic articles have shown that less than 10% of  
benefit corporations actually produce the required reports in the studied 
states, and most statutes have no express penalties for failing to report.27 
 
22 J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise and Investment Professionals: Sacrificing Financial 
Interests?, 40 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 765, 769 (2017). 
23 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301 (2017) [hereinafter MODEL BENEFIT CORP. 
LEGIS.], 
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%
20_4_17_17.pdf  (last visited Sept. 6, 2019). 
24 See id.; Business Roundtable Redefines, supra note 2 (showing that, interestingly, neither 
the BRT’s 2019 Statement nor the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation lists creditors 
as stakeholders to be considered). 
25 Compare MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 401–402, with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§ 366(b). (noting that the Delaware statute does, however, specifically allow PBCs to 
mandate annual reporting, public posting, and use of  a third-party standard in the PBC’s 
certificate of  incorporation or bylaws). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(c).  
26 See John Tyler, et al., Producing Better Mileage: Advancing the Design and Usefulness of  
Hybrid Vehicles for Social Business Ventures, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 235, 264 (2015) 
(“Although benefit corporations must assess themselves against a third party standard 
(which may or may not be weak or meaningful) and publish a benefit report, failure to 
comply with the underlying standards is not actionable legally.” (citing MODEL BENEFIT 
CORP. LEGIS. § 401 (2013))). 
27 See J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 26, 
31–32 (2015) (“Data from early benefit corporations shows an abysmal benefit report 
compliance rate (below ten percent), drawing into question the claims about heightened 
transparency . . . . Currently, a minority of  states require filing the report with a government 
entity; a majority of  states do not. A few states have expressly stated penalties for failing 
to produce a benefit report, but most states have not stated a specific penalty and may be 
relying on the broad benefit enforcement proceedings to enforce the reporting 
requirements.” (citations omitted)); see also J. Haskell Murray, Examining Tennessee’s for-Profit 
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The benefit corporation statutes are also incredibly loose on the reporting 
requirements, mandating narrative descriptions rather than any specified 
data or metrics.28  
Directors who are serious about benefiting all stakeholders could 
direct the corporation to engage in more detailed social reporting, looking 
to the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (“SASB”), ISO 26000, 
or another similar framework for guidance.29 Alternatively, or in addition, 
directors could start by simply supporting existing shareholder proposals 
that suggest studies and reports on various social issues like human rights 
abuses within the corporation’s supply chain and the corporation’s 
contribution to climate change.30 
IV. SUPPORT STAKEHOLDER LEGISLATION 
Directors may retort that supporting stakeholders at the expense of  
shareholders could put the company at a competitive disadvantage, 
torpedoing the entire company and harming all stakeholders in an eventual 
bankruptcy. As such, directors could, as Lawrence Summers has 
 
Benefit Corporation Law, 19 TENN. J. BUS. L. 325, 340 (2017) (“Of  the 134 domestic for-
profit benefit corporations in Tennessee, only 30 were formed before May 1, 2016. Of  
those 30, none had a published or available benefit corporation report.”). 
28 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 401–402.  
29 SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, https://www.sasb.org/ (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2020); see also MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401(c). See generally THE B 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT, https://bimpactassessment.net/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2020) 
(showing that while the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation does require use of  a 
“third party standard” in reporting, it does not require certification, nor does it require 
any specific data be reported). 
30 See Ann Lipton, Everything is About Stakeholders, BUS. L. PROF. BLOG, (Aug. 24, 
2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2019/08/everything-is-about-
stakeholders.html (“Indeed, the BR is currently fighting to make it harder for 
shareholders to introduce proposals that would force corporations to focus on – you 
guessed it – stakeholder interests, so this looks a lot less like an issue of  what is best for 
society than about who should be the decisionmaker.”); see also Subodh Mishra, An Early 
Look at 2019 US Shareholder Proposals, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE (Mar. 5, 
2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/03/05/an-early-look-at-2019-us-shareholder
-proposals/ (“Taking a closer look at the top 10 [shareholder] proposal types by number 
of  filings in 2019, we see many of  the same proposals that were part of  this list in the 
previous year, including requests to report on political contributions and lobbying, 
requests to disclose targets on carbon emissions, and proposals seeking reporting on 
sustainability and climate change risks.”). 
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suggested, champion stakeholder-focused legislation. 31 Supporting such 
legislation would come with some expense, but could change the 
competitive landscape and may prevent socially-focused firms from 
operating at a disadvantage. Many corporations already support lobbyists, 
and, in fact, the BRT itself  is largely a lobbying group.32 If  the 181 
corporate executives who signed the BRT’s 2019 Statement are serious 
about benefiting all stakeholders, lobbying for laws that benefit those 
stakeholders would go a long way toward convincing the public that the 
statement is more than mere happy talk.33 
V. PROVIDE STAKEHOLDER REPRESENTATIVES WITH RIGHTS 
Finally, and perhaps most effectively, directors could provide for 
stakeholder representatives with rights that would give these 
representatives not just a voice, but also power in the corporation. This 
proposal is argued in much more detail in my 2017 American Business Law 
 
31 See Lawrence H. Summers, If  Business Roundtable CEOs Are Serious About Reform, 
Here’s What They Should Do, WASH. POST (Sept. 2, 2019, 5:57 PM), https:// washington
post.com/opinions/if-business-roundtable-ceos-are-serious-about-reform-heres-what-
they-should-do/2019/09/02/53b05014-cdc0-11e9-8c1c-7c8ee785b855_story.html (“If  
the Business Roundtable is serious about stakeholder capitalism, and if  responsible firms 
are to flourish and spread their benefits, it will not just decree principles according to 
which its firms will operate but will also push for laws and regulations that support firms’ 
ability to stand up for their stakeholders. These might include minimum-wage and 
benefits requirements and broader mandates to protect companies that want to do right 
by their workers from those competing companies that are ruthlessly pursuing 
shareholder interests. Or they might include rigorous restrictions on advertising and 
promotion practices, so firms who are honest and transparent are not placed at a 
competitive disadvantage. Or universally high capital standards on financial institutions, 
so that imprudent willingness to take on risk cannot be a competitive advantage.”). 
32 See Donnovan Andrews, 5 Ways Companies Can Show Their Commitment to Improving 
the World, FORTUNE (Sept. 24, 2019, 5:19 PM), https://fortune.com/2019/09/24/
business-roundtable-corporate-social-responsibility/ (noting that the BRT is a “lobbying 
group”); see also lan Rappeport & Thomas Kaplan, Democrats’ Plans to Tax Wealth Would 
Reshape U.S. Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/
10/01/us/politics/sanders-warren-wealth-tax.html (referring to the BRT as “a lobbying 
group for large companies”). 
33 See Reuters, Walmart’s Chief  Executive to Chair the Business Roundtable, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/19/business/18reuters-walmart-
mcmillon-business-roundtable.html (explaining that the BRT has been accused of  doing 
the exact opposite of  this proposal and “lobbying against social and environmental reform 
efforts.” (emphasis added)).  
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Journal article.34 In short, that article does not propose providing all 
stakeholders with corporate governance rights, as that would be unwieldy. 
Rather, the article suggests that each corporate stakeholder group could 
elect a representative to act on its behalf.35 Providing significant corporate 
governance rights to stakeholder representatives—such as the ability to 
elect directors or sue derivatively—would require shareholder consent, but 
directors could engage in consultations with stakeholder representatives 
immediately. Directors could also provide stakeholder representatives with 
information rights and could engage in stakeholder update calls, as they 
currently do for shareholders.  
CONCLUSION 
Many commentators are rightfully skeptical of  the BRT’s 2019 revised 
statement of  corporate purpose that moves away from shareholder 
primacy and toward a multi-stakeholder approach. If, however, the BRT 
members are actually serious about valuing nonshareholder stakeholders, 
the BRT members could increase their credibility by attempting to 
implement some of  the corporate governance changes proposed and 
discussed in this article.
 
34 See generally J. Haskell Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory Boards, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 
61 (2017). 
35 Id. at 98–105.  
